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Abstract. Biometric authentication, and notably using fingerprints, are now 
common. Despite its usability, biometrics have however a caveat which is the 
impossibility of revocation: once the raw fingerprint is breached, and depending 
on the technology of the reader, it is impossible to stop an illegitimate authenti-
cation. This places a focus on auditing both to detect fraud and to have clear in-
dications that the fingerprint has been breached. In this paper we show how to 
take advantage of the immutability property of Blockchains to design an audita-
ble protocol based on Diffie-Hellman key exchange with applications to finger-
print authentication. 
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1 Introduction 
Fingerprint biometrics are nowadays a mature and widespread technology for authen-
tication. It has several advantages being the two most important its usability (by being 
inherent to virtually any human) and accuracy since two people having the same fin-
gerprint pattern is extremely rare. Fingerprint authentication has also seen commercial 
use in access control and application security and an example of such is seeing many 
modern mobile phones supporting it. There is however an important caveat which is 
the relative easiness of capturing fingerprints and later re-creating (say with wax fin-
gers) and, post-incident, the impossibility of revoking a lost fingerprint in its original 
form.  
In a world where one can only expect to have the identity stolen at some point in 
the future, biometric authentication is likely to become a reliable, yet non-
authoritative (e.g., for legally binding actions), means of authentication. More than 
with any other security control, once an illegitimate attempt was successful, one can 
only expect more incidents to follow. Obtaining reliable evidence of the vulnerable 
step in the authentication flow where the invalid authentication happened is of para-
mount importance to harden systems, provide security checkpoints (such as multi-
factor) and, in general, assess the risk against the sensitivity of the resources accessed. 
A simple example is with a bank account. If it is known that the fingerprint of a hu-
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man has been illegitimately used, allowing bank transfers purely based on it is per-
haps not advisable but viewing a bank statement is likely to meet the risk profile. 
Audit trails, in the form of reliable and authoritative data on the process, along with 
real-time notifications, thus play a key role. Following the bank account example, 
after an incident has been recorded, it is likely that the bank will want to know where 
the vulnerable step happened; for example, if the authentication was successful be-
cause the fingerprint did match or whether it was deeper in the process and a mis-
matching fingerprint (or any other form of authentication) was accepted. 
This paper proposes and discusses how blockchains can be used to provide an au-
thoritative mechanism to prove, beyond any arbitrary level of doubt, that an illegiti-
mate but successful identification took place at the fingerprint scan stage. Blockchains 
have the inherent property that, if enough time has elapsed (that depends on its size), 
whatever data is stored in it becomes immutable thus providing an excellent medium 
to store audit trails and reliable access notifications upon which one can act on. 
The challenge we tackle is how to involve a blockchain in the authentication pro-
cess. We do so by creating a protocol similar to Diffie-Hellman key exchange that, 
instead of running peer-to-peer, is ran intermediated by a blockchain. Considering that 
blockchains, whatever its form, typically require private keys to interface it, this 
scheme inherently provides multi-factor authentication. We envision our work to be, 
in fact, generic to any type of biometric authentication that relies on pre-acquired 
templates (such as images of fingers or iris) but we will keep the scope to fingerprints 
in order make the problem easy to discuss. 
In section 2 we present the technical background on fingerprint biometrics and 
blockchains. In section 3 we present our approach and in section 4 we illustrate with 
an implementation strategy using Ethereum and the Solidity language, a public block-
chain supporting smart-contracts. We conclude our paper in section 5. 
2 Background 
This section gives a technical background on fingerprint biometrics and blockchains; 
it further discusses related work in the area. 
2.1 Fingerprint biometrics 
Fingerprint recognition is based on identifying a user by comparing stored fingerprint 
data (at enrolment stage) with input fingerprint data obtained in real-time. An auto-
mated fingerprint recognition system is concerned with fingerprint acquisition, minu-
tiae extraction, minutiae match and storage [1]. There are two main phases: enrolment 
and authentication. Before a user can authenticate, s/he needs to record the images on 
an enrolment module. The minutiae (wiggling patterns virtually unique to everybody) 
are extracted and stored in a template with an associated user ID. The template is, 
typically, further transformed as explained below.  On authentication, the authentica-
tion module extracts a minutiae pattern from the image (the probe) to compare with 
the corresponding user ID template in the system. A matching algorithm will then 
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determine a matching score which, given a threshold, will then make a decision to 
accept or not.  
Storing the templates of users is a central problem because, if breached in the raw 
form, it is impossible to revoke in the sense of revoking a certificate or changing a 
password. Cancellable biometrics is a key technique to help with this problem. In-
stead of storing the raw image or template, a distorted version is used either using a 
non-invertible transformation or biohashes [2] with the latter offering convenient 
fixed sizes templates. 
2.2 Blockchains and Smart Contracts 
Blockchains are a recent, and still maturing, technology having its first appearance to 
solve the “double-spending problem” in a digital currency and later recognised to 
solve the more generic “two generals’ problem”.  It has evolved from its first applica-
tion, Bitcoin, to now support generic scripting (smart contracts) as is the case of 
Ethereum. Whether it is information, in the sense of a ledger as in Bitcoin, or algo-
rithmic methods and execution state, such as in Ethereum, Blockchains have the dis-
ruptive property of immutability: once stored, data is subject to cryptographic opera-
tions that are virtually impossible to reverse without abundant computing resources 
which is made further harder as time passes and as blocks (holding information) are 
added since they are interlinked. Therefore, if enough time is elapsed (i.e., enough 
computing effort is spent) it becomes virtually impossible to modify or destroy a rec-
ord which brings auditing potential [3]. 
2.3 Related Work 
Whereas literature is rich and abundant in biometrics authentication [4][5], and 
Blockchains are already being analysed in research and academic literature, beyond 
commercial applications, very few works have approached the combination of the two 
techniques. Hammudoglu et al [6] propose a mobile biometric-based authentication 
system for a self-sovereign identity solutions. It integrates a permissionless block-
chain with identity and key attestation to be used in mobile phones. This work, how-
ever, is focused on how to implement self-sovereignty but storing secret and bio-
metric material in full user control rather than the generic scenario of ours which is 
enhancing current biometric systems with auditing capabilities of blockchains. A 
similar remark can be made for Nandakumar et al [7] which design a fairly complete 
system relying on private blockchains and mixing the blockchain’s consensus layer 
with biometric material so that the decision of matching is distributed. This is further 
made secure by using secret sharing techniques such as Shamir’s. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to combine biometrics with 
blockchains and especially to use blockchains to enhance the auditability of an au-
thentication process. 
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2.4 Problem Statement 
The trace of the authentication is the central point of this paper. Our attacker model is 
simple: finger can be stolen or a copy of the fingerprint can be re-created. Our ap-
proach does not directly mitigate this problem; rather, it gives trusted means for a user 
to be notified and later audit the security breach since an adversary cannot delete rec-
ords. Another possible attack vector is an inside malicious actor: no authentication 
was done but it is claimed to have happened. Since the insider is able to manipulate 
the logs, there is no way to credibly dispute or disprove there was, or was not, authen-
tication via fingerprint. If an authentication point has been compromised, there will be 
no trace left in the blockchain. 
3 Approach 
Our approach is based on Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange (DHE) which allows the 
generation of a shared secret between two parties over an insecure channel. In order to 
make the authentication process auditable, while protecting the biometric material, we 
use the blockchain as a secure and immutable medium on which messages exchanged 
cannot be modified once written and enough time has elapsed. Fig. 1 shows our 
scheme. 
The user, previously enrolled, request authentication by using an agent application. 
This could be a mobile application. The authenticator responds with the following. It 
initiates the protocol by sending (random) parameters for the protocol (, ) and (not 
shown in the diagram), the location of the smart-contract such as its address. It is 
assumed the user has secret keys to access the smart-contracts which, effectively, acts 
as a second-factor for the authentication process. The public key of the authenticator, 
perhaps obtained in real-time from a certificate sent by the authenticator (e.g., using 
TLS), is used to encrypt both the remaining material of DHE and also to send a ran-
dom nounce, . Shown in dashed lines is the implicit broadcast process of a block-
chain: once the block is mined, it is broadcast to all participating nodes. At this point, 
an audit point A1 is created proving the user possesses the keys to interact with the 
blockchain. 
The authenticator receives and decrypts the first message of DHE along with the 
nounce. Still using the blockchain, the authenticator publishes both its component of 
DHE and the nounce decrypted thus proving it possesses the public key and it is the 
right endpoint to send authentication material. This creates audit point A2. The user 
and the authenticator have now a shared secret,  = 	
 = . The user scans the 
finger (optionally transforming in the sense of cancellable biometrics) and encrypts 
with shared secret  its fingerprint. It further can encrypt with the receiver’s public 
key for better privacy and forward-secrecy. This creates audit point A3. The client 
then publishes in the blockchain the result ′ which holds the fingerprint scan.  Upon 
a match, the authenticator records the result and the user is granted access. At any of 
the audit points, a notification to the user should be sent. Noting that these points are 
blockchain-wide, and any client for that blockchain can read it, the impact of a com-
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promised agent that is preventing notifications is reduced. 
The result of this process is there will now be an undeletable trace on the block-
chain of an authentication attempt, whether successful or not. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Signalling diagram and audit points. 
 
4 Evaluation 
We used SourceAFIS [8] framework as the fingerprint authenticator. We’ve 
built a simple client that is fed with fingerprint images which, when compared 
the ones in the database produces, a matching score. We’ve complemented 
with an interface to Ethereum that executes the protocol in Fig. 1 and executes 
the various stages on a Smart-Contract. 
4.1 Implementation 
The (simplified) smart-contract code is shown in Fig. 2. The code simply acts 
as a medium to exchange messages by implementing two generic methods for 
message passing of the two peers, called Alice and Bob. We assume, although 
it is not necessary, that a new contract will be created for every authentication 
attempt. When the contract is created by the authenticator, the user’s address 
USER_ADDRESS will be hardcoded in the contract for control purposes. This 
provides the claimed 2-factor authentication as only the keys to that address 
will be able to interface the contract. 
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contract Authentication { 
  String message; 
   
  constructor() public { 
    supplicant = USER_ADDRESS; 
    user_authenticated = false; 
  } 
 
  function bob( string msg ) public { 
    if (msg.sender == authenticator) { 
      message = msg; 
    } 
  } 
     
  function alice( string msg ) public { 
    if (msg.sender == supplicant) { 
      message = msg; 
    } 
  } 
 
  function auth_result() { 
    if ( msg.sender == authenticator )  
    user_authenticated = true; 
  }; 
} 
Fig. 2. Simplified smart-contract code. 
 
4.2 Evaluation 
As expected, running a protocol over a smart-contract is significantly slow 
when compared with point-to-point protocols. We deployed and ran the con-
tracts in a local Ethereum test network where no other contracts were being 
executed. This assured that every block was predictable given the low load in 
mining and confirmations occurring about every 15 seconds. Running the 
protocol took minutes as expected and one should note that this is the simplest 
case where, e.g., no retries exist and the network has no load. A further practi-
cal issue is storage which, for the time being, makes this somewhat unfeasi-
ble. Since, at certain point, the user sends the fingerprint, regardless of how 
compressed it may be, it will take up space which, in a public blockchain may 
be unfeasibly expensive.  
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5 Conclusions and Outlook 
This paper discussed the usage of a blockchain, and smart-contracts, to enable 
trusted audits of fingerprint biometrics. As seen, any biometric process that 
requires exchange of media can take advantage of this protocol to guarantee 
that actions leave an unmodifiable audit trail that can later be analysed. 
 Our scheme needs improvement, nevertheless, given its impracticalities, 
notably using the blockchain to store the candidate fingerprint. Furthermore, 
the time it takes to authenticate a user is also of consideration which may de-
feat the typical usability of biometrics as an authentication vector. These and 
other issues are the subject of our current and future work. 
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